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IN THE SUPRE.IVIE COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL T. PALMER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-VS-

WASATCH CHE,MICAL COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT
In general respondent agrees with the sketchy
statement of facts contained in appellant's brief. However, respondent deems it necessary to elaborate on appellant's statement and to point out the following facts
which I believe are of great importance:
A. It is admitted, by everyone, that chemically
pure (CP) sulphuric acid, if pennitted to escape from its container, is an inherently dangerous instrumentality which if it comes in
contact with the human being is capable of
placing human life and limb in imminent danger, which facts were well known to appellant.
B. The acid which was in the glass jar when delivered weighed ninety eight pounds net and
the empty glass jar and carboy weighed 35.5
pounds, making a total weight of the container and contents 133.5 pounds. Tr. 52.
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C. That after the filled containers arrived in
Salt Lake City at appellant's dock, they were
unloaded from the car and placed on the dock;
that thereafter said carboy was in the sole
custody of appellant until delivered to respondent in the storage room used for that
purpose; that in filling the order for General
Mills on May 16, 1958 the three carboys were
taken from the warehouse and placed in a
truck owned and operated by appellant
(whether the shipment contained additional
carboys is unknown). Furthermore, there is
no positive evidence as to how these three
carboys were packed in appellant's truck for
delivery. Tr. 145 . Fred Mills, the driver
who made the delivery, had nothing to do with
the loading and he has no recollection as to
how the carboys were fixed so as to prevent
movement while enroute. Tr. 145; that there
are lots of startings and stoppings of the
truck enroute from Salt Lake City to Ogden.
Tr. 146.
D. When Mills, the driver, arrived in Ogden at
General Mills office building, he unloaded
these three carboys weighing 133.5 pounds
each from the truck and placed them on the
ground. He then obtained a small two wheeler
hand truck and placed each carboy on it so
that about one-half of the botton1 of the carboy rested on the foot brace. The remaining
half had no support. He then transported
them around to a rear stairway and trucked
each down about twelve to fifteen steps to the
place of storage. Tr. 138. He was asked:
Q. "Was there any bumping as yon let them
down the stairs f"
2
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A. "Yes, very much." Tr. 139.
He then pushed the truck into the storeroom
where the carboys were custmnarily stored
and deposited the same on a cement floor. He
made no inspection of the carboy when it was
placed on the floor after its bumping ride
down the steps. In fact, he made little or no
inspection of the carboy from the time he
started from Salt Lake City. When the bottorn
fell out of the carboy it was picked up, together with the broken bottom and parts,
which were placed in the broken carboy; that
it was not touched until about August Sixth
when one of appellant's drivers picked it up
and returned it to appellant's dock where it
remained for an hour or so and then an enlployee of General Mills returned it to its plant
where it remained under lock and key until
brought into court. Only three of the bottom
rubber bumpers or cleats which supported
the glass bottle were produced (Tr. 12 and
106) and the whereabouts of the remaining
·one was not accounted for. In view of the
evidence produced by defendant to the ·effect
that if all bumpers are solidly placed the
glass jar cannot drop from its position, it is
fair to assume that the missing rubber buruper
was absent when delivered to General :Mills
and that the bumping ride down the steps and
into the storage room dislodged the bottle and
permitted it to rest entirely on the bottorn of
the carboy; that the botton1 was not designed
to carry the weight of the glass bottle ( 98
pounds plus weight of the jar) and that when
lifted fron1 the floor the ·entire bottmn became dislodged. Tr. 37. In fact, there can be
no question but what the accident happened
3
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in the manner detailed by respondent's witnesses.
E. That the court submitted the- issue of
breach of .warranty to the jury under eight
special interrogatories, all of which were
answered .by the jury in plaintiff's favor.
The answers thereto were amply supported by
the evidence.
F. That at the conclusion of the trial the court
dismissed plaintiff's first count (negligence)
on the theory, as stated by the court, that res
ipsa loquitor cannot apply to a retailer even
though it involves an inherently dangerous
instrumentality.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

Point l. The trial court was correct in submitting
the issue of breach of warranty (Count
Two) to the jury under special interrogatories.
Point 2. The trial court was in error in dismissing respondent's first count (negligence) and in refusing to submit this
issue to the jury.
ARGUMENT
We admit at the outset that the subject of liability
in the so called "products liability field" both in adjudicated cases and text writers is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. The reason for this no doubt is
due largely to a gradual break down of the strict common law rule which shield unreasonably both the manufacturer and jobber or retailerr where injury resulted
to a purchaser or consumer of manufactured goods or
4
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commodities.
old rule was,

The first case to break away frorn the

McPherson vs. Buick
111 N.E. 1050
which was decided in 1916. The late Justice Cardozo is
the author of this opinion. The case itself involved
personal injury to a subvendee of an automobile having
a latent defect. There was injected into the case the
element of a dangerous instrumentality which because of
a latent defect made the auto a dangerous instrumentality, although in the absence of such a defect it was entirely harmless.
Harper and James, professors of law, Yale U niversity, have recently authored a new text in three volumes
covering the law of torts. It is of course impossible to
quote at length the discussions found therein, all of
which are supported by citations in the foot note. However, we will refer to a few general statements founded
m this excellent work.
Volume 2, Chapter 28, cornmencing at Page 1535,
undertakes a discussion of the subject of liability of
suppliers of chattels. Section 28.1 is an introductory·
discussion of the subject wherein it is stated, among
other things,
"The older restrictive doctrine was well adapted
to protect the manufacturer fro1n burdens on his
activity, but it did so at the expense of the victims
of his mistakes.
The citadel of privity ha~
crumpled, and today the ordinary tests of duty,
negligence and liability are applied widely to the
man who supplies a chattel for the use of.another.
This trend was responsive to ever-grow~ng pres-5
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sure for .protection of the consumer, coupled with
a realization that liability would not unduly in~
hibit the enterprise of manufacturers and that·
they were well placed both to profit from its
lessons and to distribute its burdens."
Section 28.2, Page 1536 :
"Anyone who supplies a chattel for use or custody
or possession by another comes under· some duties
arising out of the transaction. This is so whether
the transaction is a gift, a sale, a loan, lease, or
other bailment * * * * * * And the supplier will
come under these duties whether he is owner,
seller, maker, bailee, bailor, or custodian of the
chattel."
·
Page 1539:
"Since the supplier's duty of care 'extends to all
who may foreseeably be hurt by lack of care, it
is scarcely surprising that this duty is not necessarily satisfied by disclosures of dangers."
Page 1599:
"If the dealer has been negligent, his liability i8
no more circumscribed by privity than is the
maker's. It extends to anyone who might fore·
seeably have been injured by the defect."
Section 28.30, Page 1599 discusses the subject of
retailers strict liability.
"1. Liabilities under warranties. The most common source of a retailer's liability for injury
caused by defective chattels is either the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purposte, or that of 1nerchantability-which is increasingly recognized as including a ·warranty
of fitness for usual purposes. The injured person
is more often in privity with the retailer than
6
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with the maker; hence, a warranty theory is
more often available in these cases."
"The principal controversy concerning the retailer's liability rages over the question whether
or not he warrants the fitness of products obtained from reputable suppliers and sold in their
containers under circumstances where the buyer
realizes that his seller could not and did not
inspect the contents of the container. Probably
the majority of the American courts (both at
common law and under the Sales Act) now hold
the retailer strictly on his warranty."
"The retailer should bear this as one of the risks
of his enterprise. He profits from the transaction and is in a fairly strategic position to
promote safety through pressure on his supplier.
Also, he is known to his customers and subject
to their suits, while the maker is often 'nnknown
and may well be beyond the process of any court
convenient to the customer. Moreover, the retailer is in a good position to pass the loss back
to his supplier."
Page 1602,
"For the nwst part the same considerations that
call for strict liability of the retailer also support strict liability of the wholesaler to the victirn.
Surely if the retailer is to be held in warranty,
he should be able to look to his supplier on a
similar warranty."
Section 28.32 summllrizes the entire chapter and
deals with choice of remedies and Section 28.33, Page
1605 evaluates the rules as previously discussed.
It is to be noted from the foregoing authorities
that the injured person rnay combine in one suit lia7
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bility both for negligence ·and breach of warranty. Plaintiff by his amended complaint- relied upon both. However, the court took from the jury the question of negligence but submitted to the jury under special interrogatories the question of breach of warranty.. We
reserve for future discussion this alleged error. Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to give
his requested instructions, all of which were designed
to be submitted to the jury under a general verdict.
As previously noted, the court submitted the case to
the jury on special interrogatories. We think the
court's instructions fully and correctly instructed the
jury and that no prejudicial error resulted.
In answer to these interrogatories, the jury found
as facts that:
A. Plaintiff and his fellow employee raised the
container in a reasonably prudent manner.
B. That the acid was released when the carboy
was being lifted.
C. That the release of the acid presumably caused
by the defects present in the bottle or carboy, or both.
·
D. That the facts as found were inconsistent with
any other reasonable hypothesis but that a
defect, or defects, in the bottle · or carboy
proximately caused the release of the acid.
E. That the facts as found were inconsistent with
the hypothesis that the defect present on
delivery was a substantial defect.
B~aring

in 1nind the oft repeated rule that the
findings as made by th·e trier of the fac.t will be ·susA
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s.tained if there is any substantial evidence .or any
logical inference to support the same, we contend that
these findings are amply supported by the evidence
or logical inferences deducted therefrom and that the
instructions are ample to support a special verdict.
Appellant cites cases and texts writers relating
to the liability of a retailer who merely acts as a conduit through which the goods pass from manufacturer
to consumer. However, it must be noted that in this
case the defendant was not merely a conduit through
which the goods passed but here we are dealing with
a situation where the retailer or jobber (defendant)
delivered a commodity to the consumer by transporting
the same from Salt Lake City to Ogden and then
delivering the package to the place of storage, which
gave rise to a situation that if in making this delivery
and in exposing the package to dangers by the method
adopted in bumping the same down a flight of stairs
and then failing to inspect the sarne after the package
had reached its destination, this would amount to a
breach of warranty and negligence. In other words,
the jobber was an active participant in the delivery
of a commodity which, if improperly secured, became
a highly dangerous instrurnentality.
We believe that this court in two recent decisions
has recognized this distinction :
Schneider vs. Shuhrrnann, etal
7 Utah 2nd ............... .
327 P. 2nd, 822
Bondon vs. Shuhrmann, etal
7 Utah 2nd................ .
327 P. 2nd, 826
.c
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In both of these cases suit was brought against both
the manufacturer · and the retailer. Judgment, however, was rendered ·against the retailer. The facts in
these cases are that the retailer rendered a service to
the commodity after he acquired the product from the
supplier. If he failed to render this service properly
then he was guilty of both negll.gence and breach of
warranty, so in our case the jobber (defendant) rendered
a service by delivering the commodity to the purchaser.
If in the course of rendering that service he was negligent or if as a result of this service the product was
rendered inherently dangerous, a jury may find him
guilty of negligence, or if as a result of this service
the product was rendered inherently dangerous there
is a breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
Appellant appears to make some point from the
fact that the carboy and container were not sold to the
purchaser. We fail to appreciate this distinction. Certainly it involved a bailment of the carboy and jar and
there would certainly be a representationthat the same
would hold the acid. Appellant contends there was a
lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant. (See
Page 20 of his brief). We have already cited authority
to the effect that lack of privity is no longer adhered
to when dealing with a dangerous instrumentality, the
question being whether or not it was foreseeable that
some third person might be injured while using the
same.
We cite the following additional cases which sustain
our position:
10
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DiVello vs. Gardner Machine Company
Ohio
102 N. E. 2nd, 289
Burr vs. Sherwin-Williams, etal
California
268 P. 2nd, 1051
Spencer vs. Madsen
Tenth Circuit
142 Fed. 2nd, 820
State Insurance Fund vs. City Chemical Corporation
New York
48 N .E. 2nd, 262
Mueller vs. Bronx-Syhon Company
New York
6 N.Y. 2nd, 903
See also 11 ALR Annotation commencing at Page 1251
Chapman Chemical Company vs. Taylor
222 S.W. 2nd, 820
There is another point which we wish to develop
in conll'ection with the liability of the supplier to the
purchaser. Ths matter is discussed in Harper and
James, Vol. 2, Section 28.28 at Page 1594 under the
heading "WHO IS A MAKER". It is true that the
name Allied Chemical and Dye is found on a label
attached to the carboy but there is nothing contained
therein which would indicate that the product was not
in fact prepared by defendant. General Mills had purchased this product from defendant and there is nothing
to indicate that it ever knew that defendant was not
in fact the maker of this product. The authors state
at Page 1594 :
"Under the prevailing modern rule, one who
lJ
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represents a product to be his own is subject to
the same liability as though he were its. n1aker
even if in fact it was manufactured by another."
See large number of cases cited in note, Reinstatement
torts, Section 400, comment D.
There seems to be considerable confusion as to
whether there must be privity of contract between the
seller and the injured consumer and whether the strict
liability of warranty implied in la'v is limited to foods
or whether it should be extended to au· dangerous
instrumentalities liable to cause human suffering or
death. Thus subject is discussed in,
Harper and James, Vol. 2, on Page 1569 and after
some general discussion the authors at Page 1571 state:
"But where commodities are dangerous to life
and health, society's interest transcends that of
protecting reasonable business expectations. It
extends to minimizing the danger to consun1ers
and putting the burden of their losses on thosP
who best can minimize the danger and distribute
equitably the losses that do occur. And since
the warranties involved in these cases do not
represent the expressed or ilnplied-in-fact intent
of bargainers, but are warranties imposed by
law as vehicles of social policy, the courts should
~xtend them as far as the relevant social policy
requires.
Then after a general discussion the author at Page
1573 concludes as follow·s:
"No valid reason appears for distinguishing hetween food cases and others so far as the priYit~v
requirem'ent is concerned."
12
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and in the footnote it cites the case of,
Pillars vs. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
78 Southern, 365
wherein the defendant contended that the maker of chewing tobacco should not be held liable for impurities negligently incorporated therein because tobacco was not food
and privity was required for liability in cases not involving food, beverages, etc. The court conceded that
tobacco was not food "but we are of the opinion that
we are not restricted to this narrow question, nor have
we reached the limit when we admit that tobacco is not a
beverage, or a condiment, or a drug. The fact that the
courts have at this time made only the exceptions mentioned to the general rule does not prevent a step forward
for the health and life of the public." The authors then
conclude with the following comment under Note 14:
"Even if it should be felt that the restriction
should be relaxed gradually and first in the field
of greatest danger, the food area is not necessarily the most dangerous field. Greater peril
lurks in a defective automobile wheel than in a
pebble in a can of baked beans."
Two interesting cases dealing with impure foods,
privity contract and absolute warranty are,
Decker vs. Kapp
164 SW 2nd, 828
a suit against the manufacturers of impure foods; and,
Gregg Canning Company vs. Josey
164 SW 2nd, 835
decided the same day by the same court, this latter case
involving a suit by consumer against retailer. In both
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instances the court held that in the case of impure food
both the manufacturer and retailer are absolutely liable
under a warranty implied in law without refe~ence to
how the food was prepared or packed, or as to whether
the manufacturer or seller had notice of the impurities.
It seems to us that if this rule applies to impure
foods and if as the authors suggest, there is no valid
reason for distinguishing between food cases and others,.
then it seems to us that this smne doctrine should be
extended to explosives, or sulphuric acid which if allowed to 'escape is deadly in character.
POINT TWO

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: Appellant
complains of the failure of the trial court to instruct
properly as to the law of contributory negligence. As
a matter of fact, the court, when ruling on defendant's
motion for a directed verdict, said: Tr. 234.
"I'll rule out contributory negligence in this case
on strict warranty. I can't see any possibility to
it. I don't see enough facts to support contributory negligence."
We think the trial court was correct in his ruling as
to contributory negligence. It seems rather difficult
to understand how defendant could contend that it was
not negligent in failing to discover the defect and then
claiming plaintiff was himself negligent in what he did.
Furthermore, the answer of the jury to the special interrogatories absolved plaintiff of any negligence.
We contend, therefore, that the issue as to breach
of i1nplied warranty presented an issue of fact to be
14
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submitted to the jury; that the court was justified in
submitting this issue through special interrogatories;
that the instructions of the court were full and complete
and that in any event no prejudice resulted therefrom.
We contend, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HIS
CROSS APPEAL
1. We contend that the court was in error in taking

from the jury the issue as to negligence. We realize
that if the judgrnent is sustained then this ruling becomes 1noot but if this court should reverse and order
a new trial then this matter would become important
and should be examined. The trial court based his
ruling upon the grounds that the rule of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be invoked against a retailer. We think, therefore, that the trial court was clearly in error. We contend first that independently of the application of the
rule there was sufficient evidence of defendant's negligence to submit to the jury. In support of our contention we again call to the court's attention the fact
that after defendant had obtained possession of the
carboy, it undertook to render an additional service;
namely, to transport it to Ogden and deliver it to the
basement of General Mills. If in rendering this service
defendant was negligent and if such negligence contributed to the accident, then this became an issuable
fact to submit to the jury.
2. Secondly, we contend that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies in this case and that the application of the rule n1akes it an issuable fact to be sub15
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bitted to the jury.
1. Considering the deadly effect of sulphuric acid;
the breakable nature of glass jars; the weight of the
container, 133.5 pounds; the fact that only one-half of
the bottom of the carboy was supported by the hand
truck and then to bounce the same down twelve to fif~
teen stepes and then make no inspection of the carboy
to ascertain the effect or condition, is sufficient in itself to justify submitting the issue of negligence to the
jury.

2. Res ipsa loquitur: For an exceUent discussion of
this doctrine see,
Harper and James, Vol. 2, commencing at Section 19.5 Page 1075 and extending to Page 1107.
We can only refer to some general observations. At
Page 1081 the authors point out that the following
conditions for the application of the doctrine are:
1. The accident must be one that ordinarily
would not occur in the absence of negligence.

2. Both inspection and use must have been at
the time of the injury in defendant's control.
3. The injurious occurrences or conditions n1ust
have happen'ed irrespective of any voluntary
act on plaintiff's part.
·
The text then proceeds to discuss each of these prop~
ositions. Section 19.6 discusses point one. We think
there can be little question but what the facts con1e within point one. Point two is discussed in Section 19.7,
Page 1085. It will no doubt be argued by defendant
that the defendant parted with control when it deposited
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the carboy in the storage roorn on May
ever, as the text points out, the term
trol" is frequently misunderstood and
do not generally apply this requirement
stated.

16, 1958. How"exclusive conthat the courts
as it is literally

"The requirement as it is generally applied is
more accurately stated as one that the evidence
must afford a rational basis for concluding that
the cause of the accident was probably such that
the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it."
The jury by its affirmative answer to interrogatories
4A and B found as a fact that the defect was present
at the time defendant delivered the carboy. This finding precludes any possibility that the def'ect arose or
was created after the carboy had been delivered to
General Mills. Point three is discussed in Section 19.8
at Page 1093. H'ere again the jury found that the
plaintiff and his assistant raised the container in a
reasonably prudent manner. (Interrogatory No. 1.) We
contend, therefore, that the evidence, together with the
answers of the jury, brought the case strictly within
the rule. For an exhaustive discussion of the rule and
its application see,
Yborra vs. Spangard
Calif.
154 P. 2nd, 687

This court has recently had occasion to discuss the rule
in the case of
Joseph vs. L. D. S. Hospital
348 P. 2nd, 935.
17
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It is true that in this .case this court held that the rule
did not apply for the reason that the evidence disclosed
that the accident could occur without negligence on anyone's part but we are confident that this. objection cannot apply. The evidence points unerringly to the fact
that this accident could not have happened but for
n'egligence of either the defendant or Allied Chemical,
or both.
We have found no case nor text writer which has
suggested that the rule cannot apply to a retailer, the
We can see no
reason advanced by the trial court.
logical reason why it should not apply to a retail'er as
well as a manufacturer if the retailer undertook to
render a service involving a dangerous instrumentality
where the jury might well find that the defect was
caused by some act of the retailer.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should be sustained but that in the
event this court should reverse the trial court then that
this court should direct the reinstatement of plaintiff's
first count and submit the issue of negligence to the
jury applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Respectfully submitted,
LE ROY B. YOUNG, of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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